Chernobyl Project 2005

Actually, IAEA-WHO Chernobyl Project 2005 does not demonstrate any substantial differences comparatively to previous projects of 1990 and 1996. The composition of official information collected by experts and the methodology of data assessment applied are particularly puzzling.

In Ukraine, statistical reports officially register the following quantitative parameters of relevance to consequences of the Chernobyl disaster:

"  morbidity of persons with status of the disaster victims increased by 28.3%, while general mortality levels of the disaster victims increased from 13.3 to 14.3, and from 5.5 to 12.6 per 1000 persons among liquidators (participants of the disaster mitigation works);

"  according to the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, more than 17,448 families receive survivors' benefits in connection with the Chernobyl disaster.

These parameters represent objective evidence, because they are associated with the past lethal cases caused by consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. Another question remains — the question of causal linkages between deaths of these persons and their causes. IAEA and WHO experts attribute 56 deaths to impacts of ionising radiation and about 400 expected deaths to thyroid cancer and leukaemia. They rather boldly attribute all other deaths to radiation phobia, unhealthy lifestyles and haphazard sexual behaviour. What are underlying raw data of these expert conclusions?

Exposure assessments. In 1986, only photometry was available to control individual external radiation exposure of personnel. On 26.04.1986, due to impacts of intensive radiation flow from the damaged reactor unit, all individual dosimeters on the NPP site were exposed. The NPP Administration ordered to collect them into 2 bags and transfer them to VNIIAES (Moscow), but their further fate remains unknown. In 12:00 of April 26, 1986, KDT-02 unit was delivered from the instruments' storage facility of the Chernobyl NPP with a set of individual dosimeters, besides that, the Radiation Security Service of the NPP received the set of individual capacitor dosimeters DKP-500 (200 units) and KID-6 dosimeter set (including D-2 and D-500 dosimeters). All these measures, taken by occupational safety managers, allowed to organise sufficiently adequate individual radiation exposure control by May 10, 1986. The exposure registration point was initially organised in "Skazochniy" summer camp and then (by June 8) it was transferred to Chernobyl. Shortly afterwards, all documents with information on personnel radiation exposure were stolen from the safe of the Chernobyl NPP and all attempts to locate them failed, notwithstanding intervention of prosecutors.

Radiation exposure of mobilised reservists was estimated more roughly. Estimates of the overall radiation exposure of military servicemen in 1986-1987 suggest the figure of about 2x10 6 rem. These estimates provide no indication whatsoever on individual exposures and their qualitative parameters.

Estimates of radiation exposure of local residents were based on Methodological Principles of Estimates of External/Internal Radiation Exposure of Residents of Areas, Contaminated by Radioactive Products of Accidental Releases of the Chernobyl NPP, approved by L. A. Iliin (the Chairman of the National Committee of Radiation Protection) on July 18, 1986. Techniques of the document allowed to make very approximate average estimates of radiation doses for conditions of a test explosion of a nuclear device. One year later, in September 1987, the Methodological Principles... were replaced by the Methodological Guidelines for Assessment of Absorbed External and Internal Radiation Doses of the Population, approved by deputy Minister of Public Health of the USSR . Using these Methodological Guidelines one cannot get any other information except average external radiation exposure doses for all residents of a given area, because all estimates are based on measurements of intensity of gamma-radiation at open ground.

Analysis of health status data of residents of contaminated territories and participants of the Chernobyl disaster mitigation works (according to information materials of different public health facilities of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia) clearly demonstrates adverse effects of the Chernobyl disaster. By 1990, in all cases, general morbidity levels increased (in addition to growing relative morbidity for some diseases), numbers of healthy persons decreased, disease symptoms altered, diseases became more dangerous and took more time to recover, diseases become more resistant to effects of medical drugs. However, there were only a few cases that demonstrated dose-effect relationships. Underlying causes incorporate both low quality of information on radiation exposure doses (see above), and inadequate level of knowledge of medical/biological effects of combined exposure to ionising radioiodine and other environmental factors.

By the end of 1991, caesium levels were determined in 65,102 samples, strontium level were determined in 18,615 samples and plutonium levels were determined in 633 samples. In additions, caesium levels were measured in 30,800 samples of milk and in 6,254 samples of potatoes. These samples were taken at 2.9 million hectares of agricultural land and at 4.0 million hectares of forests. One can easily calculate that 1 Cs sample represents more than 100 hectares of agricultural land and forests, 1 Sr sample represents 400 hectares and 1 Pu sample represents 10 thousand hectares. As for Cs levels in milk, these levels vary depending on seasons and 30,800 samples for 2,576 thousand consumers of Cs-contaminated milk can hardly provide more informative data on radiation doses than about impacts of the Tungus meteorite on corruption in Argentina.

In years after the disaster, the system of monitoring and laboratory control in Ukraine was gradually destroyed and it was replaced by the analytical system of radiation certification of human settlements ? The latter system is even less representative and has even more distant connections with individual human exposure doses. If we add that demographic and epidemiological studies in Ukraine were conducted without any accounting for radiation exposure data, we have to conclude that there are all necessary preconditions for the most wild interpretations of Chernobyl effects. One would prefer to attribute these developments to simple stupidity of Ukrainian and UN officials instead of suspecting a some sort of evil conspiracy. The real state of affairs can be identified fairly easy. It would be enough to use a research group equipped by a certified laboratory for radiation exposure, spectrographic and radiometric studies. In 6 months, such a group might examine patients with clear symptoms of Chernobyl-related diseases and close all questionable points, pertaining to Chernobyl effects.

Vladimir Usatenko,
MP of Ukraine (1st convocation),
The expert of the National Commission for
Radiation Protection of Ukraine